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In 1902 the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine filed an influential legal verdict. The judge claimed 
that in order to find a defendant culpable, the plaintiff “must adduce evidence other than a majority 
of chances”. The judge thereby claimed that bare statistical evidence does not suffice for legal 
proof.  
 
In this essay I first motivate the claim that bare statistical evidence does not suffice for legal proof. 
I then introduce and motivate a knowledge-centred explanation of this fact. The knowledge-
centred explanation rests on two premises. The first is that legal proof requires knowledge of 
culpability. The second is that one cannot attain knowledge that p from bare statistical evidence 
that p. To motivate the second premise, I suggest that beliefs based on bare statistical evidence 
fail to be safe—they could easily be wrong—and bare statistical evidence cannot eliminate relevant 
alternatives.  
 
I then cast doubt on the first premise; I argue that legal proof does not require knowledge. I 
thereby dispute the knowledge-centred explanation of the inadequacy of bare statistical evidence 
for legal proof. Instead of appealing to the nature of knowledge, I suggest we should seek a more 
direct explanation by appealing to those more foundational epistemic properties, such as safety or 




1. Legal judgement: “He must adduce evidence other than a majority of chances.” 
 
On February 6th 1941 Betty Smith was driving from Dorchester to Winthrop, Massachusetts. At about 
1am she was heading west on Main Street in Winthrop, when a bus forced her to swerve into a parked 
car. She was injured in the collision. Smith was unable to see details about the bus, except it was “a 
great, big, long wide affair”. She later discovered that only one company, Rapid Transit, Inc., had a 
route along that street. A second company operated elsewhere in town. Smith discovered, 
furthermore, Rapid Transit’s schedule included a service from Winthrop Highlands to Maverick 
Square, departing at 12:10am, 12:45am, 1:15am, and 2:15am. This route was 30 minutes long, and 
passed the location of the accident. With this inculpatory evidence, Smith sued Rapid Transit.  
 
The judge ruled that Smith’s case could not proceed to jury trial and thereby ruled in favour of Rapid 
Transit. He reasoned that there was no “direct evidence” that the speeding bus was operated by Rapid 
Transit. Smith appealed. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld the judge’s decision, 
saying: 
 
While the defendant had the sole franchise for operating a bus line on Main Street, Winthrop, this did not preclude 
private or chartered buses from using this street; the bus in question could very well have been operated by someone 
other than the defendant… The most that can be said of the evidence in the instant case is that perhaps the 
mathematical chances somewhat favor the proposition that a bus of the defendant caused the accident. This was not 
enough.1 
 
                                               
1  Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc. 317 Mas. 469, 58 N.E.2d 754 (1945).  
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The judges that ruled the evidence Smith adduced could not satisfy the legal standard governing civil 
litigation. This is somewhat puzzling. The relevant standard is “preponderance of evidence”, also 
known as the “balance of probabilities”. This is frequently glossed as satisfied if the evidence 
establishes the litigated claim is more likely true than not.2 Whilst it is possible that a private or 
chartered bus was involved, as the appellate judge notes, surely the likelihood does not approach fifty 
percent; it is overwhelmingly more likely that the speeding bus belonged to Rapid Transit. In our 
ordinary understanding, it seems Smith’s evidence establishes Rapid Transit’s culpability to a 
preponderance of the evidence.  
 
The Smith ruling draws on an earlier verdict, Day v. Boston & Maine Railroad, which is even more explicit:  
 
[The litigated claim] may be quantitively probable… Quantitative probability, however, is only the greater chance. 
It is not proof, nor even probative evidence, of the proposition to be proved… However confidently one in his 
own affairs may base his judgment on mere probability as to a past event, when he assumes the burden of 
establishing such event as a proposition of fact as a basis for a judgment of a court he must adduce evidence other 
than a majority of chances… Verdict set aside.3  
  
The judge claims that evidence that merely renders a claim quantitatively probable, but does not 
provide proof, might suffice for action in ordinary life. But, he claims, such evidence cannot support 
an affirmative verdict—that is, a finding of culpability—in legal proceedings. Legal proceedings 
engender distinctive demands about evidence.  
 
This raises questions: Are these judges mistaken? Do legal proceedings require different kinds of 
evidence from everyday life, and—if so—why? What is the legal conception of evidence, and how 
does this differ from non-legal conceptions? This chapter examines whether bare statistical evidence 
can satisfy legal standards of proof. In section two I introduce two vignettes that, when contrasted, 
suggest bare statistical evidence does not suffice for legal proof. In section three I introduce and 
motivate the knowledge-centred explanation of the inadequacy of bare statistical evidence for 
affirmative legal verdicts. In section four I articulate objections to the knowledge-centred account.   
 
2. Bare statistical evidence: “Quantitative probability, however, is only the greater chance. It is not 
proof.” 
 
The Day v. Boston & Maine Railroad judgement claims:  
 
That in one throw of dice there is a quantitative probability, or greater chance, that a less number of spots than six will 
fall is no evidence whatever that in a given throw such was the actual result. Without something more, the actual result 
of the throw would still be utterly unknown. The slightest real evidence that sixes did in fact fall uppermost would 
outweigh all the probability otherwise. Granting, therefore, the chances to be more numerous…, we still have only the 
doctrine of chances. We are still without evidence tending to actual proof.4 
 
                                               
2  In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 371–72; House of Lords in Re B (A Child) (2008) UKHL 35; Miller v. Minister of Pensions 
[1947] 2 All ER 372; Simon and Mahan (1971). 
3  Day v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 96 Me. at 207, 52 A. (1902). 
4  Ibid. Day v. Boston & Maine Railroad and Smith v. Rapid Transit do not themselves involve statistical evidence. Other 
relevant court opinions include Lampe v. Franklin American Trust Company, 339 Mo. 361, 96 S.W.2d 710 (1936); 
Sargent v. Massachusetts Accident Co., 29 N.E.2d 825 (Mass. 1940); Curtis v. United States, 117 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. 
New York, 1953); Sawyer v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 877 (M.D. Georgia 1956); Guenther v. Armstrong Rubber 
Company, 406 F.2d 1315 (3d Cir. 1969); Kaminsky v. Hertz Corp. 288 N.W. 2d 426 (Mich. Ct. App., 1980). 
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This court opinion claims probabilistic evidence, such as that pertaining to dice rolls, is “not proof, 
nor even probative evidence”. The courts instead require “real evidence”. What does this mean? To 
better see how merely statistical evidence bears on legal proof, let’s turn from civil to criminal 
proceedings, and consider the following fictional case.5  
 
Prisoner One. One hundred prisoners exercise in the yard. Security footage reveals that ninety-nine prisoners riot; one 
prisoner refuses to participate. Prison officials decide that since each prisoner is 99% likely to be guilty, they have 
adequate evidence to successfully prosecute individuals for assault. They charge Ryan with assault. A guilty verdict is 
returned. Ryan did in fact riot.  
 
Prisoner Two. One hundred prisoners exercise in the yard. Ten prisoners attack a guard. A second guard, standing at 
a substantial distance, believes he saw that Ryan was one of the attackers. Prison officials charge Ryan with assault. A 
guilty verdict is returned. Ryan did in fact riot.  
 
In many countries, including the US, UK, and Canada, criminal proceedings are governed by the 
relatively demanding “beyond reasonable doubt” standard. The evidence in Prisoner One highly 
probabilifies Ryan’s culpability; plausibly the evidence supports a .99 credence that Ryan rioted. But 
nonetheless the evidence could not properly secure conviction.6 It is implausible that we could 
legitimately blame Ryan for rioting, on this evidence, or assert that he is guilty.7 Contrast this with the 
evidence adduced in Prisoner Two. Eyewitness testimony is notoriously unreliable under many 
circumstances.8 Given this, the claim that Ryan rioted might be less likely true given the factfinder’s 
evidence, compared to the strong statistical evidence adduced in Prisoner One. But Prisoner Two 
features the kind of evidence that could warrant an affirmative verdict. Why is conviction 
inappropriate given the evidence in Prisoner One, but perhaps appropriate given the kind of evidence 
adduced in Prisoner Two? 
 
3. Knowledge and legal proof: “Without something more… the actual result would still be utterly 
unknown.”  
 
One natural suggestion holds that inculpatory bare statistical evidence does not suffice for legal 
judgement because such evidence does not lead to knowledge. The factfinder in Prisoner One cannot 
know Ryan is guilty—even if he is guilty—because his judgement relies on bare statistical evidence. 
One way to interpret this suggestion is as advancing two claims, which we can call the knowledge-
centred account:9  
 
                                               
5  Based on Nesson (1979: 1192). Gardiner (2019), especially sections “The Proof Paradox” and “Modal Epistemology 
and the Law”, provide an overview of such examples. Gardiner (ms-a) compares epistemological features of the 
prisoner vignettes to other similar vignettes employed to motivate the inadequacy of bare statistical evidence for legal 
proof. 
6  For the claim that the evidence adduced in Prisoner One cannot, or should not, warrant affirmative legal verdicts, see 
Tribe (1971), Nesson (1979), Wells (1992), Niedermeier et al. (1999), Koehler (2001), Littlejohn (2017), Blome-Tillman 
(2017), Pritchard (2017), Gardiner (2018), Moss (2018b), and Ebert et al. (2018). See Brook (1985) for dissent. Roberts 
(ms) questions how widespread the beyond reasonable doubt standard is. For surveys of the debate about statistical 
evidence securing legal verdicts, see Gardiner (2019), Di Bello (2013), and Ho (2015). 
7  Buchak (2014); Littlejohn (2017). 
8  Loftus (1996); Simon (2012). 
9  Littlejohn (2017), Blome-Tillman (2017), and Moss (2018b) develop knowledge-based approaches to explain the 
inadequacy of bare statistical evidence for legal proof, but not this exact approach.  
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Claim One.  Knowledge of culpability is required for appropriate affirmative legal verdicts.    
Claim Two.  Bare statistical evidence that p, at least of the magnitude exemplified by Prisoner 
One, does not lead to knowledge that p.  
 
In what follows I first briefly motivate Claim One. I then motivate Claim Two. To support Claim 
Two, I argue for two features of knowledge: (i) knowledge is incompatible with easy possibility of 
error and (ii) knowledge requires ruling out relevant error possibilities. In cases like Prisoner One, bare 
statistical evidence cannot eliminate nearby error possibilities and cannot rule out relevant alternatives. 
Thus, I argue, the factfinder in Prisoner One lacks knowledge of Ryan’s guilt. So far, then, the 
knowledge-centred account appears promising. But I cast doubt on this account in section four. I 
articulate reasons for rejecting Claim One: Affirmative legal verdicts do not require knowledge of 
culpability. This suggests, I conclude, we should not appeal to the nature of knowledge to explain the 
inadequacy of bare statistical evidence for legal verdicts.      
 
i. Claim One: Affirmative legal verdicts require knowledge. 
The knowledge-centred account has appeal. In support of Claim One, knowledge is clearly a 
paramount epistemic kind. It plays significant roles in thinking, acting, and interacting. A term for 
“knows” appears in every language and it is one of the most commonly-used verbs.10 Knowledge plays 
a central role in epistemological theorising, and so is a natural candidate to explain the insufficiency 
of bare statistical evidence for legal proof. Indeed the legal decision quoted above itself invokes 
knowledge: “Without something more, the actual result of the throw would still be utterly unknown.” 
Further evidence for Claim One is that many theorists claim knowledge is required for appropriate 
assertion and action. They endorse claims like:  
 
Knowledge Norm for Assertion.  Assert that p only if you know that p.11 
Knowledge Norm for Action.  Act on p only if you know that p.12 
 
These plausible norms claim a person errs if they assert that p, or act on p, while lacking knowledge 
that p. And declaring someone criminally culpable and punishing them certainly qualify as assertion 
and action! 
 
It is plausible, furthermore, that only knowledge can legitimate reactive attitudes such as resentment 
and blame. High credence—even very high credence—does not license reactive attitudes. Lara Buchak 
(2014: 299) notes, “While reactive attitudes do come in degrees, the degree of blame I assign to a 
particular agent is based on the severity of the act, not on my credence that she in fact did it.” We 
cannot half-blame someone on a middling credence that she acted wrongly; plausibly blame requires 
knowing the person acted wrongly. This idea suggests the following norm: 
 
Knowledge Norm for Blame.  Blame someone only if you know that she transgressed. 
 
It certainly sounds unpalatable for a nation to punish citizens even when it does not know whether 
they are guilty! Thus, Claim One appears plausible.  
                                               
10  Wierzbicka (2006, §2.5); Nagel (2014). 
11  Williamson (2000, Ch. 11); Hawthorne (2004: 23). 
12  Hawthorne and Stanley (2008: 577); Anderson (2015). 
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ii. Claim Two: Bare statistical evidence is not knowledge-conducive. 
Claim Two, which holds that bare statistical evidence that p—at least of the magnitude exemplified 
by Prisoner One—does not lead to knowledge that p, also enjoys wide support. It will be helpful to 
introduce some terminology. Suppose Timmy believes, because his mother told him, that a new Bond 
film will be released in December. Garry believes this claim through divination. We can say that 
Timmy’s evidence is knowledge-conducive. Testimony about mundane topics from trusted sources is 
typically a reliable source of information. It is the kind of evidence that can, in principle, support 
knowledge. As long as circumstances are normal—Timmy’s mother is not lying, Timmy has basic 
requisite epistemic virtues, and so on—then Timmy attains knowledge. Garry’s evidence, by contrast, 
is not knowledge-conducive. Even in the “good” case, where his belief is true, Garry cannot come to 
know on this evidential basis. Garry’s evidence is not reliable and is not a good reason for belief. 
Equipped with this terminology, we can say that Claim Two denies that bare statistical evidence is 
knowledge-conducive; bare statistical evidence that p, at least of the magnitude in Prisoner One, does 
not lead to knowledge that p, even when it leads to true belief. But note that, unlike divination, bare 
statistical evidence can reliably lead to true belief. Given the statistical evidence in Prisoner One, for 
example, Ryan probably did riot. So why deny bare statistical evidence is knowledge-conducive? 
 
In support of Claim Two, consider a fair lottery. There are 10,000 tickets, and the winner is drawn but 
not yet announced. Lottie reflects on the available statistical evidence—her ticket has only a 0.01% 
chance of winning—and so believes that her ticket has not won. Her belief is true. Is Lottie’s true 
belief, based on bare statistical evidence, knowledge? Many epistemologists say no.  
 
One reason for thinking Lottie lacks knowledge is that her belief, based on bare statistical evidence, 
could easily be wrong.13 There is a nearby error possibility; a significant risk of false belief. And if a 
belief could so easily be wrong, the thought continues, it is not knowledge. Knowledge enjoys a kind 
of stability. And Lottie’s merely statistical evidence cannot provide this stability. Recall the dice in Day 
v. Boston & Maine Railroad: “That in one throw of dice there is a quantitative probability, or greater 
chance, that a less number of spots than six will fall is no evidence whatever that in a given throw such 
was the actual result.” A person who, using bare statistical evidence, believes that a thrown die will 
not land six is likely correct. Their belief has an 83% chance of being true. But nonetheless the belief 
could easily be wrong. We cannot rely on the claim being true, since it might easily not be. The world 
need not be very different for the die to land six; the outcome is not at all remote. This close possibility 
of error seems inconsistent with knowledge.    
 
We can contrast the evidence available to Lottie with evidence that is knowledge-conducive. Millie 
asks people what their middle names are. Based on Jim’s testimony, Millie correspondingly truly 
believes Jim’s middle name is David. There is some chance, given Millie’s evidence, that her belief is 
false. Some people lie or are mistaken about their middle names. Perhaps their first and middle names 
were switched during childhood and they ignore this when reporting. Or perhaps they have multiple 
middle names and only report one. They might have two last names, but for simplicity report one as 
a middle name. Or they might omit a middle name that is disliked or evokes estranged relatives. 
Perhaps the likelihood of error, given Millie’s evidence, is above 0.01%. That is, perhaps if Millie asked 
                                               
13  Sosa (1999), Williamson (2000), Hawthorne (2004: 56), Pritchard (2005), and Dutant (2016) discuss the claim that 
knowledge is incompatible with easy possibility of error. Gardiner (ms-a) argues that, even though Lottie’s lottery belief 
could easily be wrong, some beliefs based on bare statistical evidence are modally secure. I thereby dispute the safety-
based explanation of the inadequacy of bare statistical evidence for legal proof.   
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10,000 people more than one would reply inaccurately. But nonetheless this is the kind of evidence 
that can support knowledge, at least in principle. If Jim tells the truth, then typically Millie comes to 
know Jim’s middle name. In other words, Millie’s evidence—testimony about a person’s middle 
name—is knowledge-conducive. 
 
This contrast suggests the reason Lottie’s evidence is not knowledge-conducive is not simply the 
probabilistic likelihood of error. Millie’s evidence is also fallible, yet is knowledge-conducive. Instead, 
the thought goes, the deficiency of Lottie’s evidence is the very close possibility of error. Not much 
must change for her belief to be false. It could easily happen. But with Millie’s evidence, by contrast, 
error is a more distant possibility. The world would have to be rather different for Millie’s belief to be 
false. (Jim would have to have lied, rather than tell the truth, for example, which is a significant 
difference.)  
 
Some epistemologists demur. They hold Lottie can know, via statistical evidence, that her ticket has 
lost.14 (The received view holds Lottie cannot know.) After all, Lottie is 99.99% likely to be correct, 
given her evidence. But note that if we reduce the size of the lottery, it becomes even less plausible 
that Lottie knows her ticket lost. If the lottery is small enough, everyone agrees Lottie lacks knowledge. 
After all, a coin toss is the limiting case of a fair lottery. There are only two “tickets”, one of which 
wins.15 And no one—not even a committed pessimist—will claim that, just by reflecting on the odds, 
you know that you lost a coin toss!  
 
The Prisoner One vignette can be understood as epistemically akin to a 100-ticket lottery—albeit with 
morally significant outcomes.16 It is highly implausible one can know a ticket has not won a 100-ticket 
lottery merely by reflecting on the odds. Given the evidence, the factfinder could easily be wrong 
about Ryan’s guilt. Indeed, were he to repeat the process for every prisoner, false conviction is 
guaranteed. This easy possibility of error supports Claim Two: bare statistical evidence is not 
knowledge-conducive.17  
 
A second consideration supporting Claim Two is that if a person knows p, she can rule out relevant 
error possibilities.18 Suppose Linda observes a bird and believes it is a house sparrow. Does Linda’s 
belief qualify as knowledge? Plausibly this depends on Linda’s abilities at discriminating house 
sparrows from other birds. If Linda cannot tell a house sparrow from a house wren, house finch, or 
rose-breasted grosbeak, then intuitively she does not know the bird is a house sparrow. This is because 
when she sees the bird and forms the belief she cannot rule out other relevant possibilities, such as 
the bird’s being a house wren. If Linda is an experienced birdwatcher who can visually discriminate 
                                               
14  Hill and Schechter (2007); Reed (2010); Sosa (2015: 120).  
15  Unfair lotteries, with weighted tickets, can produce a greater than 50% chance of winning.  
16  If Lottie lacks knowledge with her overwhelming statistical evidence (1:10,000), this strongly suggests the Prisoner 
One evidence is not knowledge-conducive, since that statistical evidence is far weaker (1:100). Note Gardiner (ms-a) 
critically evaluates the claim that Prisoner One is epistemically akin to a lottery. 
17   Claim Two specifies that bare statistical evidence, at least of the magnitude in Prisoner One, is not knowledge-
conducive. Perhaps extremely high statistical evidence—evidence indicating p is 99.99999999% likely—can underwrite 
knowledge. But such magnitudes do not arise in prisoner vignettes or ordinary lotteries.   
18  For early influential treatments, see Austin (1946), Dretske (1970), Stine (1976), Goldman (1976), Cohen (1986), and 
Lewis (1996). See also Vogel (1999), Lawlor (2013), McKinnon (2013), Gerken (2017), and Ichikawa (2017). Rysiew 
(2006) emphasises the plausibility of a Relevant Alternatives Condition. Ho (2008), Amaya (2015), Moss (2018a, 
2018b), and Gardiner (ms-b, ms-c) appeal to a relevant alternatives framework to explain the inadequacy of bare 
statistical evidence for verdicts.  
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house sparrows from other birds, then Linda does know. But, the thought continues, Linda need not 
be able to rule out every other possibility. She need not be able to distinguish house sparrows from 
lifelike robots, Cartesian demon illusions, or computer simulations. In ordinary cases, these error 
possibilities are irrelevant to whether Linda knows the bird is a house sparrow. 
 
Reflecting on Linda suggests the following necessary condition on knowledge:  
 
Relevant Alternatives Condition.  S knows that p only if S can rule out relevant alternatives to p.  
  
This condition includes three major components: alternatives, relevance, and ruling out. The first of 
these is relatively straightforward. An alternative, A, is a claim incompatible with the target belief, p. 
If A is true (the bird is a wren), then p is false (the bird is not a sparrow). The other two components 
are more controversial. Relevant alternatives are those error possibilities that cannot be properly 
ignored. We have some intuitive grasp on which alternatives are relevant: The possibility that Linda 
observes a bird other than a house sparrow cannot be properly ignored. The lifelike robot possibility 
can, in normal cases, be properly ignored.19 Plausibly, an error possibility cannot be properly ignored 
if the available evidence suggests the error possibility obtains. If the bird looks like a wren, for example, 
this is a relevant possibility. Similarly, plausibly an error possibility is relevant if it is believed or is being 
seriously considered by the subject. If Linda wonders whether the bird is a wren, for example, this 
error possibility is relevant.  
 
The third component, ruling out, is also controversial. We can gloss ruling out an alternative as having 
some evidence that discriminates the truth from the alternative. Alvin Goldman (1976: 771, 774) writes, 
 
… a cognitive mechanism must enable a person to discriminate or differentiate between incompatible states of affairs. It 
must operate in such a way that incompatible states of the world would generate different cognitive responses…  A 
person knows that p, I suggest, only if the actual state of affairs in which p is true is distinguishable or discriminable by him 
from a relevant possible state of affairs in which p is false. If there is a relevant possible state of affairs in which p is 
false and which is indistinguishable by him from the actual state of affairs, then he fails to know that p. [Emphasis in 
original.] 
 
In order to know, Linda must possess some evidence that differentiates the truth from relevant 
alternatives, such as the bird’s being a wren. Perhaps, for instance, she can tell the bird is larger than 
a wren, or that its beak is too thick. If she lacks such evidence, she is unable to eliminate the relevant 
error possibility and lacks knowledge.  
 
Claim Two, recall, holds that bare statistical evidence that p, at least of the magnitude exemplified by 
Prisoner One, is not knowledge-conducive. The Relevant Alternatives Condition on knowledge 
bolsters this claim. Lottie’s belief that her ticket did not win the lottery is very likely true, given the 
statistical evidence adduced. But the possibility that her ticket won is a relevant alternative. The “it 
could be you” structure of a lottery—that winning could so easily happen and would be so 
significant—renders the possibility salient. It cannot be properly ignored.20 But Lottie lacks evidence 
that discriminates her true belief from this relevant error possibility. This suggests Lottie fails to know 
her ticket did not win. Lottie’s reasoning from bare statistical evidence is not knowledge-conducive.  
 
                                               
19  The disguised robot possibility might be relevant in some abnormal contexts, such as a lifelike robot convention.  
20  Lewis (1996: 557). 
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In Prisoner One the factfinder likewise lacks the ability to discriminate p (Ryan is guilty) from relevant 
alternatives (Ryan refused to riot). These options are indistinguishable given the evidence available. 
This contrasts with the kind of evidence adduced in Prisoner Two, where eyewitness testimony 
differentiates Ryan from the non-participating prisoners. The eyewitness evidence might not be 
infallible—the witness might be mistaken or dishonest—but it is the kind of evidence that can address 
relevant alternatives. Unlike the bare statistical evidence in Prisoner One, eyewitness evidence can, in 
principle, differentiate the truth from relevant alternatives. Reflecting on the Relevant Alternatives 
Condition suggests that, since he cannot discriminate the truth from relevant error possibilities, the 
Prisoner One factfinder lacks knowledge.  
 
This insight illuminates Smith v. Rapid Transit. (Recall Smith v. Rapid Transit does not involve any 
statistical evidence and so differs significantly from statistical evidence examples like Prisoner One.) 
Smith’s evidence renders it very likely that the bus was operated by Rapid Transit. But her evidence 
fails to address the relevant alternative: Her evidence does not speak to the possibility of a privately 
owned or chartered bus. If, as the Relevant Alternatives Condition holds, Smith knows Rapid Transit 
is responsible only if Smith can eliminate relevant error possibilities, then Smith lacks knowledge. It 
might be unlikely that the bus was privately owned, but Smith’s evidence says nothing that 
differentiates her contention from this possibility.  
 
Thus the knowledge-centred explanation for the inadequacy of bare statistical evidence for affirmative 
legal verdicts is promising. The explanation holds that factfinders cannot rule against the person unless 
they know the person is culpable. And merely statistical evidence, at least of the magnitude in Prisoner 
One, is not knowledge-conducive. 
 
Indeed, Claim Two suggests a further knowledge-based explanation of the inadequacy of merely 
statistical evidence for affirmative legal verdicts.21 If merely statistical evidence is not knowledge-
conducive, and the court knows it adjudicates with merely statistical evidence, then the court convicts 
Ryan despite knowing it lacks knowledge. It seems particularly bad for a nation to punish citizens 
while knowing it lacks knowledge of culpability. In some unfortunate cases the court may, through 
unnoticed deficiency, lack knowledge. Perhaps a trusted witness was convincingly lying, for instance, 
or a crucial DNA test was faulty. But in such cases the court relies on knowledge-conducive kinds of 
evidence that went awry in the particular case, and does not know it lacks knowledge. If a court relies 
on bare statistical evidence, by contrast, the court is aware that its evidence is not knowledge-
conducive.  
 
But the knowledge-centred account has weaknesses. Recall the two claims: 
 
Claim One.  Knowledge of culpability is required for appropriate affirmative legal verdicts.   
Claim Two.  Bare statistical evidence that p, at least of the magnitude exemplified by Prisoner 
One, does not lead to knowledge that p.  
 
Above I argued that Lottie’s belief based on bare statistical evidence could easily be wrong. Even if 
her belief is true, it is a nearby possibility that her belief is false. And I argued that bare statistical 
evidence that p cannot rule out relevant error possibilities. These considerations suggest that Claim 
                                               
21  Blome-Tillman (2017); Littlejohn (2017). 
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Two is correct: bare statistical evidence that p is inadequate for knowledge that p. But let us revisit 
Claim One. Is knowledge required for affirmative verdicts? 
 
4. Objections to the knowledge-centred account: “Verdict set aside.” 
 
In what follows I sketch four weaknesses of Claim One. Firstly, if criminal convictions require 
knowledge of the defendant’s guilt, why don’t theorists say this? Legal practice, legal scholarship, and 
philosophical scholarship feature longstanding intense debate about the “beyond reasonable doubt” 
standard.22 There are debates about what the standard is, whether jurors understand it, and whether 
and how it should be explained to jurors. If the standard of proof governing criminal conviction is 
knowledge, these debates are mysterious. There are at least two mysteries. Firstly, if knowledge 
governs criminal proceedings, why does the legal system appeal to the standard “beyond reasonable 
doubt” at all, rather than simply invoking knowledge? Secondly, as described above, knowledge is a 
common, familiar idea, a central notion in everyday thought and talk, and is paramount in 
epistemology. Indeed, epistemology is typically glossed as “theory of knowledge”. Given this 
familiarity, if “beyond reasonable doubt” should be glossed simply as “knowledge”, why don’t more 
theorists and practitioners perceive this connection? 
 
A second problem is that the knowledge-centred explanation of the inadequacy of bare statistical 
evidence for legal judgement does not readily extend to less demanding standards. Legal systems 
employ a variety of standards, including “preponderance of evidence”, which governs civil and family 
courts, and the “clear and convincing evidence” standard, which governs equity cases such as right-
to-die hearings, wills, libel, child custody, paternity disputes, and commitment to mental institutions.23 
Plausibly knowledge of culpability is not required for these lower standards. And so further 
explanation is required for the inadequacy of bare statistical evidence for satisfying these less 
demanding standards.24  
 
The third and fourth problems claim that beyond reasonable doubt is less demanding than knowledge 
and that it is more demanding. Firstly, beyond reasonable doubt is less demanding than knowledge. 
Knowledge is factive: If p is false, S does not know p. But plausibly a compelling case for a person’s 
guilt can satisfy the legal threshold of beyond reasonable doubt even if the person is innocent, and so 
false convictions can nonetheless be procedurally correct. “Beyond reasonable doubt that p”, in other 
words, plausibly is not factive; it does not entail p. This threatens Claim One: Knowledge is not 
required for legal verdicts.  
 
Advocates of the knowledge-centred explanation of the inadequacy of bare statistical evidence for 
legal verdicts can respond in two ways. Firstly, they could aver that beyond reasonable doubt is not 
satisfied unless the claim is true. This would be a revisionary position.25 Alternatively, they could 
                                               
22  Gardiner (2019) surveys these debates.  
23  United States v. Fatico, 458 F Supp. 388 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Sand and Rose (2003). Legal standards in the US—including 
prison and police proceedings—include probable cause, reasonable suspicion, clearly erroneous, substantial evidence, 
reasonable indications, reason to believe, some credible evidence, substantial evidence, and even “some evidence”.  
24  Blome-Tillman (2017) and Moss (2018b) discuss knowledge-centred approaches to interpreting lower standards.  
25  Although see Duff et al. (2007: 69); Moss (2018b: 224); Ho (2008: 116; 122). One might hold that “beyond reasonable 
doubt that p” is not factive, but argue “S proved that p” is factive, and so “proof beyond reasonable doubt” is factive. 
But this approach is less intuitive for lower standards: It is implausible that “S proved p to a preponderance of the 
evidence” is factive.  
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maintain that, even though beyond reasonable doubt is not factive and knowledge is factive, beyond 
reasonable doubt can nonetheless be understood by reference to knowledge. Beyond reasonable doubt 
requires all the other conditions of knowledge, but does not require truth. Adherents might thereby 
advance a weaker variant of Claim One:  
 
Claim OneWEAKER.  Knowledge-conducive evidence of culpability is required for appropriate 
affirmative legal verdicts. 
 
Adherents to this strategy would identify the epistemic properties of knowledge-conducive evidence. 
Perhaps knowledge requires evidence that is conclusive, eliminates relevant error possibilities, is 
sensitive, safe, ensures reliability, and so on. We need not worry here about the details of these 
epistemic conditions. All that matters for the purposes of this chapter is that these conditions are 
variously posited as necessary conditions on knowledge-conducive evidence. On this approach, 
whichever evidential features are required for knowledge are thereby required by the beyond 
reasonable doubt standard.  
 
One weakness of this approach is that once we are evaluating these evidential features directly, and 
discussing whether they are required for beyond reasonable doubt, one might wonder whether 
knowledge itself has dropped out of the picture: Perhaps beyond reasonable doubt requires conclusive 
evidence, evidence which eliminates error possibilities, sensitive evidence, reliable evidence, and so 
on, regardless of whether these epistemic properties are required for knowledge, and regardless of 
whether beyond reasonable doubt should be understood by reference to the evidential conditions of 
knowledge. We can investigate the epistemic properties of beyond reasonable doubt directly, without 
considering whether the properties are necessary for knowledge and whether knowledge is necessary 
for beyond reasonable doubt. This objection to the knowledge-centred approach is bolstered by the 
fourth objection. 
 
The fourth objection to the knowledge-centred approach is that beyond reasonable doubt seems more 
demanding than knowledge.26 Knowledge is common. We can know things from simple testimony. 
We can even possess knowledge in some topics, such as whether human activity affects climate 
change, despite widespread disagreement. Knowledge requires good reasons. Perhaps knowledge 
requires ruling out relevant error possibilities. But plausibly mere knowledge does not require ruling 
out all reasonable error possibilities. This is too demanding for mere knowledge. We can gain knowledge 
from testimony, for example, even if it is not a wholly unreasonable possibility that the speaker is 
lying; we can normally simply disregard that possibility.  
 
It makes sense that beyond reasonable doubt is more demanding than mere knowledge. Beyond 
reasonable doubt governs an unusually severe and serious domain. Life and liberty are at stake. 
Knowledge, by contrast, governs relatively mundane affairs. A surgeon knows her neighbour visited 
Tenerife in 2015 and her son has history class on Tuesdays. She might well possess sufficient evidence 
to know these claims without much investigation; evidence need not be outstanding in order to be 
knowledge-conducive. Knowledge is ubiquitous. But, the thought goes, the operating surgeon needs 
                                               
26  Perhaps the “clear and convincing evidence” standard, which is weaker than beyond reasonable doubt, better 
matches the epistemic threshold for knowledge. Cf. Gardiner (ms-c).  
 11 
outstanding evidence—more than mere knowledge-conducive evidence—about which kidney to 
remove. For severe matters, more than knowledge is required. The surgeon must be wholly certain.27   
 
If beyond reasonable doubt is more demanding than knowledge, this does not itself directly threaten 
Claim One. Claim One articulates a necessary condition for beyond reasonable doubt, not a sufficient 
condition. Perhaps beyond reasonable doubt is knowledge plus other conditions, such as ruling out 
additional error possibilities, considering all adducible evidence, or being utterly sure. Adherents to 
the knowledge-centred explanation of the inadequacy of merely statistical evidence argue knowledge 
(or, given objection three, knowledge-conducive evidence) is necessary for warranted legal verdicts; 
and this condition—combined with statistical evidence not being knowledge-conducive—explains 
why Prisoner One’s verdict is unwarranted.  
 
But if knowledge itself is neither sufficient nor necessary for beyond reasonable doubt, this further 
attenuates any relationship between knowledge and legal proof, which chips away at the knowledge-
centred explanation.   
 
And we might plumb further and ask why knowledge-conducive evidence is necessary for beyond 
reasonable doubt. Answers to this question might invoke features of knowledge-conducive evidence 
that have legal value. A guilty verdict should not have significant, nearby risk of being false, because a 
state should not convict if false conviction is a nearby possibility. Plausibly therein lies the legal value 
of knowledge-conducive evidence since—as argued in section 3ii—if the factfinder employs such 
evidence, he could not easily be wrong. Or if a state convicts Ryan it should have something to 
differentiate his guilt from innocence; legal justice demands that evidence addresses the relevant 
alternative that Ryan did not riot. Knowledge-conducive evidence insures such relevant alternatives 
are addressed. Thus, once we plumb we may well find support for Claim One flows from particular 
epistemic features—immunity from easy error and ruling out relevant alternatives—that are desirable 
in legal verdicts.  
 
And recall that we appealed to these very same particular epistemic features to motivate Claim Two. 
In light of the four objections articulated in section four, which cleave knowledge from legal verdicts, 
this suggests a more direct approach: Excise knowledge from the explanation, and appeal directly to 
the fulcrum epistemic features themselves.  
 
In section three we examined a knowledge-centred explanation of the inadequacy of bare statistical 
evidence for legal verdicts. This strategy appeals to particular epistemic features to argue that 
knowledge-conducive evidence (or knowledge) is necessary for beyond reasonable doubt. It argues 
those fulcrum epistemic features are legally desirable and are properties of knowledge. The strategy 
then appeals to those very same fulcrum features again to explain why bare statistical evidence is not 
knowledge-conducive. It argues bare statistical evidence cannot secure those particular epistemic 
features, and those features are necessary for knowledge. One could instead more directly argue the 
                                               
27  For discussion see Brown (2008: 1144–1145); Reed (2010: 232); Lackey (2010). Those who maintain knowledge is 
sufficient for proof beyond reasonable doubt must explain away the intuition that beyond reasonable doubt is more 
demanding. They might argue that knowledge and beyond reasonable doubt have equal epistemic criteria, but beyond 
reasonable doubt, embedded in legal settings, requires additional procedural conditions to obtain. Perhaps both require 
possessing evidence that eliminates all reasonable error possibilities, for example, but beyond reasonable doubt also 
requires subjects to consider this evidence explicitly. This approach, if plausible, can retain the claim that knowledge 
and beyond reasonable doubt are on par, epistemically, and diagnose the sense that the latter is epistemically more 
demanding by conceding that it is procedurally more demanding.    
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fulcrum epistemic features themselves are necessary conditions on affirmative legal verdicts, and those 
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